An independent reviewer, live

A two-minute, no-installation demo of Domain Atlas's third-party attestations (SPEC.md §5.11).

Click below and this page issues you a real, signed filing — an ordinary document credential from this domain. Then this same domain's SECOND, independent key — generated once, published separately, and never used to issue anything else here — signs its own opinion about that exact filing, standing in for an independent reviewer or auditor: it never touches, holds, or needs permission from the key that issued it. Everything below is genuine signing and genuine independent verification against two separately-published keys, not a mockup. (The protocol works exactly the same way across two genuinely separate domains — see the footnote below.)

What this looks like for a real business

Swap "filing" for a license, a certification, or an insurance policy, and swap "reviewer" for a regulator, an auditor, or a certifying body. Each one signs its own claim, with its own key, checkable by anyone — and can withdraw its own opinion on its own schedule, without needing to touch, hold, or ask permission from whoever issued the thing it's talking about.

Step 1 — get a demo filing

Issued by this domain.

Step 3 — verify any credential, independently

Paste a credential's raw JSON below and check it — the filing above, or the attestation about it. This runs entirely in your own browser: it fetches the SIGNING key's own published file and this domain's revocation list directly — atlas-key.json for the filing, atlas-reviewer-key.json for the attestation, two different keys published at two different paths — then checks the signature and looks the id up in the revocation list. Nothing here trusts this page; try changing a field above (the claim, say) before verifying, and watch it fail.

Nothing on this page is stored in a database anywhere. The filing and the attestation are two separate signatures — from two separate keys, over two separate payloads — revoking one never touches the other, and neither key was involved in producing the other's signature at all. The reviewer's identity here is a second key this domain publishes at .well-known/atlas-reviewer-key.json, generated once, on first use, and never reused for anything this domain itself issues — genuinely a different key, independently fetchable and revocable, without needing a second domain deployed anywhere. Nothing stops a real deployment putting this role on an actual separate domain instead (its own ordinary .well-known/atlas-key.json, the same shape the Lobby's Neighbor Workshop portal already relies on for a genuinely separate second domain) — the verification above works identically either way; this demo just keeps both identities on one running server so it works standalone, with nothing else to deploy. Back to the plaza.