A two-minute, no-installation demo of K-of-N multi-party approval, built entirely on Domain Atlas's existing signed-payload mechanism (SPEC.md §6.2).
Click below and this page generates three independent keypairs, standing in for three bank officers, plus a fourth for whoever's receiving the transfer. Requesting a transfer creates a real pending record on this domain's own server — nothing executes yet. Only once two of the three officers each independently fetch the exact request and sign it does the transfer actually happen: a real credential, minted live by this domain, exactly the same mint every other demo class on this site already uses. One signature alone is provably not enough, and a signature over anything other than the real request is provably rejected — try the "forge a signature" button below to see that for yourself.
Swap "bank officer" for a company director, a treasury team member, or a co-signer on a shared account — the same control real corporate treasuries already use for wire approvals ("dual control," the four-eyes principle), done with signatures instead of a bank's own internal workflow tooling. Removing an officer who's left the company would use the exact same revocation mechanism every other credential in this protocol already has — no separate access-control system needed alongside it.
Generates three officer keypairs and one recipient keypair, all in this tab.
Nothing here is faked to make the demo work: the mint on execution is a genuine signed credential from this
domain, verifiable the same way every other asset on this site is (fetch .well-known/atlas-key.json,
check the signature, check the revocation list). Two things this demo deliberately simplifies, stated plainly
rather than glossed over: the three officer keys live in one browser tab instead of three separate devices
(same single-page trick the attestation demo uses for its own second
identity — the protocol works identically across genuinely separate devices, this just keeps the walkthrough to
one page), and the list of who's authorized to approve is named directly on each request rather than backed by
a persistent, revocable membership credential the way a real deployment should use — see this page's own
source and the issuer's server-side comments for the reasoning on both. Back to the plaza.